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TAX NOTE
INCOME TAX-STATUS OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS AS
DEPRECIABLE PROPERTY
A taxpayer acquired the CBS network affiliation contracts of two
television stations in connection with its acquisition of all the assets of
these stations. The network affiliation contracts were for two-year terms,
automatically and indefinitely renewable for successive two-year terms
unless either of the parties gave six months' written notice of its intention
to terminate.' The taxpayer treated these contracts as depreciable assets
and claimed depreciation deductions on the cost allocated to the con-
tracts. The deductions were disallowed by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. The Tax Court,2 after considering expert testimony (which
was, in turn, supported by statistical data on the annual rate of contract
terminations in the industry) ruled (1) that an estimated useful life of
the affiliation contracts could be determined with reasonable accuracy,
and (2) that the use of the straight-line method over twenty years was
a reasonable basis for calculating depreciation of the contracts. On
appeal, held, reversed: Each contract is more unique than generic, which
makes it questionable whether any meaningful general experience could
be used to predict its expected valuable life. There being no reasonable
basis for the prediction of the expected valuable life of this intangible
asset, the asset is not the proper subject of depreciation allowance. Com-
missioner v. Indiana Broadcasting Corp., 16 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5465
(7th Cir. 1965).
To be depreciable, an asset must have a determinable useful life.
No problem exists as to the existence of any life span with tangible assets,
since these assets are definitely subject to exhaustion.3 Some intangibles
have been found to be definitely subject to exhaustion, the courts having
been liberal in calculating their useful life based upon reasonable esti-
1. The affiliation contracts in question are similar to others in the industry, especially as
to the renewal provisions, and are assignable. In Rev. Rul. 57-377, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 146,
the Commissioner found sufficient similarity in television affiliation agreements to permit
promulgation of a ruling which was by its terms applicable to all such contracts throughout
the industry.
The ruling equated the contracts with goodwill in holding that they were non-depreciable
assets. It states in part:
The cancellation or termination of a satisfactory network station arrangement
is not lightly considered. Such cancellation or termination, if it takes place at all,
is based on the existence of economic circumstances at the time cancellation or
termination is considered and has no relationship to the two-year period of the
network contract.
2. Indiana Broadcasting Corp., 41 T.C. 793 (1964).
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a) provides:
There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the
exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence):
(1) of property used in the trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income.
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mates.' However, many intangibles are not subject to definite exhaustion.
Typical of this class of intangibles are contracts, licenses, and franchises,
when they have automatic renewal features. The most difficult problem
presented to the courts by this second class of intangibles is the effect of
renewal terms on the determination of a limited useful life.
Of the few courts which have considered the question, most have
taken the position that such an asset is depreciable over a substantial
initial term without regard to possible renewals.' Generally, however,
when the initial term has not exceeded three years, the majority of courts
have refused to disregard the possibility of renewals. Unable to ascertain
any definite limit to the possible renewals, these courts have invariably
ruled that the life is indefinite, rather than limited, with the result that
no depreciation is allowable.'
An early case, Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,7 which involved a contract
with no fixed or stated term, has most often been cited for the proposition
that depreciation is not allowable when the life is indefinite. The definite-
4. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956) provides:
If an intangible asset is known from experience or other factors to be of use in the
business or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length of which
can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may be the
subject of a depreciation allowance. Examples are patents and copyrights. An intan-
gible asset, the useful life of which is not limited, is not subject to the allowance for
depreciation. No allowance will be permitted merely because, in the unsupported
opinion of the taxpayer, the intangible asset has a limited useful life. No deduction
for depreciation is allowable with respect to goodwill.
This regulation and those similar under prior Revenue Acts have been applied by the
courts to allow depreciation based upon reasonable estimates. E.g., Latendresse, 26 T.C. 318
(1956), aff'd, 243 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1957) (the useful life of the right to insurance renewal
commissions was actuarially ascertainable) ; Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O'Malley, 277 F.2d
128 (8th Cir. 1960) (the useful life of right-of-way easements which depended upon avail-
ability of natural gas was measurable by the estimated life of the gas reserves). The Service
announced in Rev. Rul. 60-317, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 452 that it will not follow this decision.
5. E.g., Birmingham News Co. v. Patterson, 224 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ala. 1963) (a
contract with a thirty-year initial period which would be automatically renewable for the
succeeding ten-year periods); Flynn, Harrison & Conroy, Inc., 21 B.TA. 285 (1930) (a
contract with a two-year initial term to continue in force from year to year subject to
cancellation by either party). The Tax Court later rejected this decision in Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co. Inc., 36 T.C. 912, 920 (1961) ; see also, WDEF Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 215 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (a television broadcasting license granted by the
F.C.C. for an initial three-year term subject to renewal as approved by the F.C.C.). The
Service has ruled that an F.C.C. license has an indeterminate useful life and is therefore non-
depreciable. Rev. Rul. 56-520, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 170.
6. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied 372 U.S. 935 (1963); KWTX Broadcasting Co. v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 406
(5th Cir. 1959); Nachman v. Commissioner, 191 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1951); Tube Bar, Inc.,
15 T.C. 922 (1950).
7. 6 B.TA. 1333 (1927). The Board of Tax Appeals stated:
The instrument stipulated that upon the happening of certain contingencies the
contract could be canceled by either party and under certain circumstances the
privilege granted therein could be revoked by the Coca-Cola Co. and given to
another, but the happening of these events was so indefinite and uncertain as to form
no basis for the determination of the useful life of the contract . . .
Under the terms of the contract herein involved there was no exhaustion of
the capital investment by the lapse of time. (Emphasis added.) at 1335.
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ness proposition was later applied to the license renewal area in a liquor
license case, Nachman v. Commissioner.' The application of the proposi-
tion to that case resulted in a denial of depreciation on the grounds that
the contemplated repeated renewals of the license obviated any possible
calculation of an annual allowance.
The same rationale soon spread to other areas including television
licenses granted by the F.C.C. for three-year terms which are renewable
upon approval.
In KWTX Broadcasting Co.,9 the court noted that the F.C.C. had
never denied a renewal of its three-year license. Since it was therefore
"not known from experience or other factors"'" that this intangible asset
was useful for only a limited period, it was ruled non-depreciable.'"
In this setting, a controversy arose for the first time as to whether
a television affiliation contract had a limited useful life.' 2 In this case, the
taxpayer, Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., offered evidence through ex-
pert testimony that at the time of their franchise acquisition only two
further renewals of twenty-four months each might be reasonably certain.
Further, the expert testimony indicated that in valuing a network affilia-
tion contract for purposes of resale of a station, the practice was to
assume two renewals.
On appeal, the third circuit 8 agreed with the Tax Court that the
practice of the experts in assuming two renewals was not sufficient evi-
dence of the contract's probable useful life.' 4 Thus, the basis for the
8. See note 6 supra.
9. 31 T.C. 952 (1959), aff'd per curiam 272 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1959); contra, WDEF
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Tenn. 1963). The allowance of
amortization of the initial three-year period of the license was based on what could be
called a public policy rationale. The Tennessee District Court reasoned:
It ill behooves the Government to serve its regulatory ends by granting licenses of
a definite, limited duration, reserving the power to grant or refuse renewal, and at
the same time to contend for tax purposes that the specified definite duration of such
licenses should he disregarded.
As could be expected, the Service announced that this decision would not be followed
as a precedent in disposition of similar cases, Rev. Rul. 64-124, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 105.
10. The taxable year before the Court was governed by the Internal Revenue Code of
1939. The applicable regulation, Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(1)-3 (1939), was similar to Treas.
Reg. 1.167(a)-3 (1956) cited at note 4 supra.
11. In both Nachman and KWTX Broadcasting Co., the fifth circuit had little diffi-
culty in establishing that the initial terms of the licenses could reasonably be expected to be
renewed. Since the taxpayers in both cases bad sought deductions over the initial term only,
the question of how many future renewals could be expected to occur was not in issue.
12. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 36 T.C. 912 (1961). The automatic renewal provi-
sions of the affiliation contract were identical to those of the instant case. Indiana Broad-
casting Corp., 41 T.C. 793 (1964) rev'd, 16 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5465 (1965).
13. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied. 372 U.S. 935 (1963).
14. Similarly rejected, as having no probative value with respect to the probable useful
life of the contract, was the stipulated fact that 87 NBC affiliation agreements had expired
between Jan. 1, 1953 and April 1, 1960. These statistics did not include evidence as to the
actual life span of those agreements or as to the number of their renewals.
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disallowance of depreciation in Westinghouse was insufficiency of evi-
dence. 5
Despite the holding, however, this novel introduction of industry
statistics in the area of intangibles, and the lack of hesitancy by the
third circuit to consider termination statistics set the stage for future
litigation in this area. It now appeared only necessary that the industry
supply sufficient statistical data to overcome the deficiency which was
held to exist in Westinghouse.'6
Two years later, in 1964, Indiana Broadcasting met the challenge
in the Tax Court."7 However, a conservative depreciable life of fourteen
years was claimed in the trial of the Indiana Broadcasting case, rather
than the short fifty-five month life claimed in Westinghouse. The trial
before the Tax Court" was devoted primarily to supplying the essential
evidence upon which to determine the probable number of future renew-
als. The taxpayer's own experience did not provide an adequate basis for
making this determination. The essential statistics relating to termina-
tions of the industry's affiliation contracts were elaborately presented by
the taxpayer's expert witness. 9 While the government disagreed with the
accuracy of the conclusions drawn by the taxpayer's expert witness from
the industry's experience, surprisingly enough, it did not contend that
such experience was irrelevant to the issue.20
The court necessarily approached the problem against the backdrop
of its prior opinion in Westinghouse" which had taken judicial notice of
industry statistics. The court concluded that the taxpayer's case was not
so different from that of the general experience of the industry that the
15. The burden of establishing the reasonableness of the deduction for depredation is
imposed upon the taxpayer by Treas. Reg. 1.167(b)-O(a) (1956). It is also a well-established
principle that the Commissioner's determination of a deficiency in tax bears a presumption
of correctness. Hoffman v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 784, 788 (3d Cir. 1962).
16. Supra note 12.
17. Indiana Broadcasting Corp., 41 T.C. 793 (1964).
18. Ibid.
19. The theory of the statistical tables compiled, was that an annual rate of contract
termination for each pertinent period could be obtained by dividing the total number of years
commenced by all of the affiliation contracts during a given period into the total number of
contract terminations occurring during the same period. Using that termination rate, the
taxpayer's witnesses testified that the average life expectancy of any given contract could
be determined by applying the Poisson-Exponential Theory of Failure. The crux of that
theory is that the percentage of failure of items to which it is applied is a constant. For
example, assuming a termination rate from the table of 5 percent per year, 95 percent would
fail to survive the second year and so on. The statistics were discussed in Indiana Broad-
casting Corp., 16 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5465, 5467 (7th Cir. 1965).
20. The Government asserted that a more restricted subgrouping of industry experience
was required to prepare an applicable life-expectancy table. The Tax Court refuted this by
stating that:
• . . any selection of prior experience on which to base an estimate of future life
can be subjected to some criticism.
Indiana Broadcasting Corp., supra note 17, at 813.
21. Supra note 13.
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useful life of its contracts could not be determined with the degree of ac-
curacy required to permit a "reasonable allowance" for depreciation at
the rate of five percent per year.2
It should be recognized that a two-fold legal maneuver had been
accomplished by the use of industry termination statistics. First, the very
relevancy of such statistics in considering whether a particular contract's
life is definite was accepted. Second, the burden of proof was carried, in
the Tax Court's opinion, to establish the sufficiency of the statistics
from an evidentiary standpoint.
The seventh circuit,2" in reversing the Tax Court, used a shotgun
approach in concluding that the life of these contracts was indefinite. It
first rejected the statistical validity of the contract life expectancy tables
upon which the Tax Court had based its determination of the twenty-
year life. Because the industry is "young" and still in a state of flux, the
industry experience was deemed to be so colored as to render any decision
as to termination rates of affiliation contracts "pure guesswork. ' 24 The
contracts were considered to be assets of a constant or even expanding
value, rather than wasting2 5 assets. This was based upon the court's
analysis of the record which reflected a very high degree of stability in
the history of those affiliation contracts which have continued in force
for more than eight or nine years.2 6
Lastly, each contract was deemed to be more unique than generic,
which made it questionable whether any meaningful general experience
could ever be shown to be relevant in arriving at its expected useful life.2
It is the opinion of the writer that the proper result was reached by
the seventh circuit. The Tax Court had overlooked the fact that the
contract was not, at its inception, necessarily subject to any exhaustion
with the passage of time. The Tax Court's determination of a probable
useful life based upon industry experience confused the computational
aspects of an annual allowance with the question of basic eligibility for
depreciation. However, the seventh circuit's decision would be more
22. The Tax Court rationalized that the use of general industry experience was a logical
rule because the National Treasury could not suffer from the use of a general average by a
group of taxpayers. Id. at 815.
23. Indiana Broadcasting Corp., 16 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5465 (7th Cir. 1965) reversing,
41 T.C. 793 (1964).
24. Id. at 5469. The Court cited with approval the rationale of Nachman v. Commis-
sioner, supra note 11, and KWTX Broadcasting Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 9.
25. Wasting property is defined as:
leasehold interests; royalties; patent rights; interests in things the substance of which
is consumed, such as mines, oil and gas wells, quarries and timber lands; interests in
things which are consumed in the using or are worn out by use, such as machinery
and farm implements.
BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
26. Supra note 23, at 5469.
27. Supra note 23, at 5467.
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meaningful if it could be read as classifying these contracts as unique
to each taxpayer with the termination statistics of the industry being
consequently irrelevant."8
Further, if statistics alone were sufficient to estimate useful lives of
these assets, the next logical step in judicial thinking would be to allow
amortization of the cost of goodwill,2 9 supported by statistical analyses
of failures in the taxpayer's particular line of business.3 0
If liberality is to be awarded taxpayers in this area, it is submitted
that it should be done legislatively and not judicially.
ROBERT GROSS
28. The terminations are not related to the original two-year terms of the contracts, nor
do they relate to any future renewal periods. The cause for terminations will usually arise at
some later date and will most likely be due to the failure of the operator of the television
station to adequately carry on its business in a manner acceptable to the network.
29. Depreciation with respect to goodwill is specifically prohibited by Treas. Reg.
1.167(a)-3 (1956). While the value of a television affiliation contract and goodwill are not
synonymous, the same general principles apply to make them both non-depreciable assets. In
discussing goodwill the fourth circuit has noted:
This form of deduction has been denied because of the manifest difficulties inherent
in the computation of both the life span and the value of this intangible asset.
In fact, goodwill, in any practical sense, has no terminable life; but, rather, it con-
tinues in existence just so long as the business continues, and its value fluctuates
in direct relationship with the annual variations in the profits of the business with
which it is associated.
Dodge Brothers, Inc. v. United States, 118 F.2d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 1941).
30. For more than a century, Dun & Bradstreet has compiled, analyzed, and published
national business failure statistics, such as THE FALmuaE RECORD THROUGH 1964, which is a
failure study by location, industry, age, size, and cause.
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